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Abstract
Market risk premia play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy. If
the transmission were to work asymmetrically for positive and negative shocks, monetary
authorities would face a problematic trade-oﬀ: a temporary stimulus could boost the
economy in the short run, but at the same time sow the seeds of a painful medium-run
market reversal (the ﬁnancial stability dark side" of monetary policy of Stein, 2014). We
study the relation between interest rates, credit spreads and output in the U.S. using
monthly data and a range of nonlinear dynamic models. We ﬁnd clear signs of a reduced-
form asymmetry, but no evidence in support of the causal mechanism that underpins the
`dark side' argument: spreads rise noticeably ahead of economic slowdowns but they do not
appear to cause them directly, particularly if they move in response to monetary shocks.
This suggests that the asymmetry is best interpreted as a purely predictive relation,
with markets being particularly sensitive to bad economic news; and that it creates no
complications for monetary policy or for the exit strategy from monetary accommodation.
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1 Introduction
Credit markets are an important link in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and are
central to the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy. Expansionary mone-
tary shocks stimulate economic activity through an easing of ﬁnancial conditions, possibly via a
search-for-yield mechanism, and prolonged phases of excessively low interest rates have indeed
been historically associated with high risk appetite, booming asset prices and positive output
gaps (Borio and Zhu, 2012; Adrian and Liang, 2014; Buch et al., 2014; Gertler and Karadi,
2015). Although the nature of this mechanism is the same for positive and negative policy
shocks, the real eﬀects of such shocks may diﬀer in quantitative terms. The transmission could
be asymmetric, with a tightening in credit conditions having a stronger impact on economic
activity than a loosening of the same magnitude. Such an asymmetry arises endogenously, for
instance, in models with a constraint on equity issuance (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014) or
in setups where collateral constraints are occasionally binding (Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2013).
Since monetary shocks only have a temporary eﬀect on credit markets, such an asymmetry
would place the authorities in a diﬃcult position: expansionary policy shocks would stimulate
the economy in the shortrun but generate an opposite and larger eﬀect in the longer run, all
in all resulting in higher macroeconomic volatility and potentially ﬁnancial instability. This
is what (Stein, 2014) indicates as the ﬁnancial stability dark side" associated to monetary
interventions.1
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the nonlinearities that underpin the dark
side argument. Using the corporate bond spreads constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012) to capture credit conditions, we study the linkage between monetary policy, credit
markets and economic activity in the US in the period between 1973 and 2012. The idea
that the correlation between credit conditions and the real economy is asymmetric, and that
often good news is no news in ﬁnancial markets, is a popular one. Yet causality is central
to the question at hand: a policy trade-oﬀ can only arise if (i) credit market ﬂuctuations
have an asymmetric impact on economic activity, and/or (ii) markets respond asymmetrically
to positive and negative monetary shocks in the ﬁrst place. To study these possibilities we
start from simple predictive regressions and then move on to multivariate nonlinear models,
where local projection methods (Jorda, 2005) can be used to study the dynamics associated
to interpretable economic shocks. In this context we look at the transmission of both credit
shocks and monetary shocks identiﬁed with the external instrument strategy of (Gertler and
Karadi, 2015).
We ﬁnd that changes in bond spreads have indeed a stronger predictive power for economic
downturns than for expansions. Yet, once we isolate variations in spreads that are either
1See also Kocherlakota (2014) The issue is central to the debate on both the role of monetary policy in
the run up to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and the risks associated to Quantitative Easing, Bernanke (see 2015);
Krugman (see 2015).
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exogenous or caused by monetary policy, we ﬁnd no evidence of a nonlinear impact of credit
conditions on output. This rules out hypothesis (i). The response of credit markets to monetary
shocks is economically important but again linear, thus ruling out hypothesis (ii) as well. Our
reading of these results is that the reduced-form (predictive) asymmetry is largely the product
of reverse causation, and that bond spreads simply tend to rise signiﬁcantly ahead of cyclical
downturns rather than causing them in any sense. On this regard, we provide simple but clean
econometric evidence of EBP reacting asymmetrically to macroeconomic surprises a` la Faust
et al. (2007): credit spreads are found to be strongly sensitive to bad news, whereas the do not
signiﬁcantly move in response to good news.
Our work adds to the literature on the interaction between monetary policy and ﬁnancial
stability (see, e.g. Smets, 2014, for a review); it corroborates the existence of a reachforyield
eﬀect of monetary policy in credit markets (Bekaert et al., 2013; Gertler and Karadi, 2015); and
it tests whether this mechanism could make the exit from a long period of lose money and low
spreads particularly costly, taking up a suggestion advanced by Stein (2014) and Lopez-Salido
et al. (2016). Our key conclusion is that concerns of this nature should play at best a marginal
role in setting the course of monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the literature
and use a stylized two-period model to illustrate why an asymmetric transmission mechanism
creates a trade-oﬀ for monetary policy. In section 3 we describe the data used in the empirical
analysis. In section 4 we examine a set of nonlinear forecasting regressions where economic
activity is regressed on the lagged bond spread, and this is allowed to enter the model asym-
metrically (in particular, we resort to local peak" functions to isolate in the data episodes
where spreads reached high levels by historical standards). We then move to multivariate
structural models. In section 5 we sketch our application of the local projection method and
our identiﬁcation strategies, while section 6 presents the results in terms of impulse response
functions. In section 7 we check the robustness of our main conclusions along a number of
directions, including the role of conﬁdence, uncertainty and alternative measures of ﬁnancial
distress. In section 8, we reconcile the evidence between reducedform and structural models.
Finally, section 9 concludes. In the annex to the paper we provide supplementary material and
we show that our conclusions also hold for the main euro area economies (where, if anything,
the evidence in favor of a nonlinear transmission mechanism is even weaker than in the US).
2 The Dark Side Argument
This Section comprises two diﬀerent parts. In the ﬁrst one we brieﬂy sketch Stein's (2014)
dark side argument and reference the related literature. In the second one we use a toy
model to give a ﬂavour of the tradeoﬀ faced by a central bank in a world where the linkage
between credit markets and real economy is nonlinear.
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2.1 Literature
The mechanism at the heart of Stein (2014) dark side" argument describes a causal chain
that goes from monetary policy to market risk premia and from these to aggregate economic
activity. As Stein (2014) points out, a nonlinearity must be present somewhere in this chain in
order for a policy trade-oﬀ to arise: for there to be such a dark side, there would have to be some
sort of asymmetry in the unwinding of the eﬀects of monetary policy on these risk premiums,
whereby the eventual reversal either happens more abruptly, or causes larger economic eﬀects,
than the initial compression (p.10).
The ﬁrst link in this chain has been studied in the context of the "risk taking channel"
of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu, 2012).2 Most of the literature takes a banking perspec-
tive, exploiting bank- or loan-level data to study the relation between monetary policy and
risk taking by ﬁnancial intermediaries. The results suggest that banks typically soften their
lending standards, demand lower premia and/or engage in riskier forms of investment in pe-
riods of easy monetary policy (see Jiménez et al., 2014, and references therein). (Analogous
mechanisms have been recently found to be active in equity markets (Bekaert et al., 2013) and
bond markets (Gertler and Karadi (2015) ). Using high frequency data, Gertler and Karadi
(2015) ﬁnd that monetary interventions have a small impact on short-term risk-free rates but
a fairly large impact on term and credit risk premia on corporate bonds, and that this second
channel accounts for most of their overall macroeconomic eﬀect. In particular, the Excess
Bond Premium of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), which we deﬁne more precisely in section 3,
is found to be highly sensitive to the U.S. monetary policy stance. The EBP is also a good
predictor of economic activity in the U.S. (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012), which makes it a
natural candidate for our empirical work. Woodford (2012) demonstrates that, if risk premia
follow nonlinear dynamics (a Markov process) and are subject to large upward jumps, the
policy maker faces a mean-variance trade-oﬀ even in a world where the link between spreads
and output is linear, as suggested by the quote above. Chabot (2014) ﬁnds little evidence of
asymmetric dynamics in a range of credit spreads in the U.S., including EBP. The possibility
that bond spreads respond asymmetrically to (properly identiﬁed) monetary shocks, however,
has not yet been investigated. By doing it, in the empirical section, we integrate the results in
Bekaert et al. (2013) and Gertler and Karadi (2015) along an important dimension.
The nexus between ﬁnancial markets and real economy - the second link in the chain -
is the subject of a growing theoretical and empirical literature. There is little doubt by now
that in general ﬁnancial shocks play an important role in causing business cycle ﬂuctuations
(Christiano et al., 2014; Nolan and Thoenissen, 2009; Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012; Jermann
and Quadrini, 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Gambetti and Musso, 2014). The idea that this connection
is nonlinear, and that changes in credit conditions have diﬀerent implications depending on
2The literature on the transmission of monetary policy is too vast to be surveyed here, so we deliberately
focus on the contributions that are most directly related to our work.
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the state of the economy, has clearly gained attention and credibility after the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis. Mendoza (2010), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)
develop macroeconomic models where ﬁnancial shocks are ampliﬁed in periods of ﬁnancial
distress, when agents are credit-constrained and thus essentially prevented from fully smoothing
consumption. Empirical support for this mechanism is provided by McCallum (1991), Balke
(2013) and more recently by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2013), Alessandri and Mumtaz (2014)
and Hubrich and Tetlow (2015), which show that the transmission of various macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial shocks is ampliﬁed when ﬁnancial markets are in turmoil and the economy is close
to its borrowing limit. This provides one possible justiﬁcation for the asymmetry mentioned by
Stein (2014): increases in bond spreads may have a larger impact on economic activity because
they push ﬁrms closer to their borrowing constraints. The example developed in Section 2.2
shows in what way an asymmetry of this type can create a trade-oﬀ for monetary authorities
and change their optimal response to a generic business cycle shock. In essence, the reason is
that in a nonlinear world a temporary compression in credit spreads has two distinct eﬀects
on the future distribution of output: it raises its expected value (for the usual reasons) but it
also increases its variance, because the reversal of the spread towards its equilibrium level will
cause an even larger output drop at some unknown point in the future. In this situation policy
makers may well decide to be relatively more passive and accept a lower expected output level
for the sake of (keeping the spreads at their equilibrium level and) reducing volatility.
When dealing with the interactions between asset prices and economic activity one should
of course think carefully about causality. In a reducedform sense, the stylized fact that the
comovement between credit spreads and economic activity is stronger in recessions than in
booms seems generally plausible, and certainly consistent with the history of the last decade.
This however does not imply that adverse credit shocks cause large(r) output ﬂuctuations. A
reduced-form asymmetry can arise simply because investors respond more strongly to negative
news on the macroeconomic outlook. Veronesi (1999) presents a model of investment under
uncertainty where equity prices systematically overreact to bad news in good times and under-
react to good news in bad times. Beber and Brandt (2010) document that in bond markets
contrarian news generally have a stronger impact, and the combination of bad news in good
times has the largest impact on yields. This is consistent with the asymmetric nature of debt
contracts, that is such that negative news are more likely to alter investors' payoﬀs than posi-
tive news, which by and large leave them unchanged. This type of nonlinearity does not create
macroeconomic risks and does not cause any troubles to monetary authorities, so disentangling
it from the causal asymmetry that underpins the dark side argument is critical. Our strategy
to move from predictive regressions to (variously identiﬁed) structural models is motivated
precisely by this objective.
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2.2 Mean-variance tradeoﬀ in a twoperiod economy
To see why an asymmetric link between credit and the economy could change monetary policy
choices, consider an economy that lasts two periods (t = 1, 2) and that is fully characterized
by two equations describing respectively the output gap y and the credit spread s:3
yt = γ∆st + ξ∆stI∆st>0 + et
st = ρst−1 + it
The output gap is aﬀected by a random disturbance et and by the variation in credit spreads
relative to the previous period. The impact of rising spreads on the output gap is negative
(γ < 0) and potentially nonlinear (ξ ≤ 0): the ξ < 0 case introduces the main asymmetry
studied in this paper (though in the empirical analysis we also consider the possibility of a
nonlinearity in the spread equation itself). The spread follows a simple autoregressive process
with persistence ρ > 0, and it is aﬀected by the monetary policy rate chosen by the central bank,
it.
4 This provides the simplest possible set up where (i) monetary policy works through credit
markets, as in Gertler and Karadi (2014); (ii) its eﬀects are temporary; and (iii) the central
bank may have to take into account that the economy adjusts non-linearly to a tightening in
credit conditions. The set up incorporates a number of extreme assumptions (here monetary
policy only works through credit markets, the pass-through from the policy rate to the spread is
complete, and spreads are not hit by additional shocks). These are useful to simplify the central
bank's problem and render the trade-oﬀ particularly transparent and have no substantive
implications for the analysis, which is of course purely qualitative. A monetary stimulus it < 0
can raise the output gap today by temporarily lowering the spread but it also sows the seeds
for the occurrence of a negative gap tomorrow, when the spread reverts back towards its
equilibrium level. Consider an economy that starts oﬀ from an equilibrium situation where
y0 = s0 = 0. At time 1 an exogenous shock e1 takes place, the central bank (CB) observes
it and decides whether and how to accommodate it by manipulating i1. No actions and no
further shocks take place at time 2. Conditional on the shock e1, the output gaps at t = 1 and
2 are a known function of the policy response:
y1 = γi1 + ξi1Ii1>0 + e1
y2 = −(1− ρ)i1 (γ + ξIi1<0)
3The example is clearly purely illustrative; further details on the derivations can be found in the Appendix
to the paper.
4We assume without loss of generality that the equilibrium level of the spread is zero; st can equivalently
be interpreted as the (zero-mean) excess premium relative to some arbitrary equilibrium level.
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In this world the policy instrument always moves in an opposite direction to the shock, so
that the CB chooses to loosen (tighten) if and only if the initial shock is negative (positive).
We can thus focus on the case of a recession e1 < 0 that creates an incentive for the CB
to implement some monetary stimulus, and study how the optimal size of such a stimulus is
aﬀected by risk preferences and nonlinearity. The loss function of a risk-neutral (RN) central
bank is simply the average output gap over the two periods, that is `RN(e, i) = y1 +βy2 where
β is the CB's discount factor. By replacing y1 and y2 and setting `
RN(e, i) = 0, we obtain the
optimal risk-neutral choice:
iRN = −1
γ
 1
1− β(1− ρ)
(
1 + ξ
γ
)
 e ≡ −κRN(ξ)
γ
e
Since κRN > 0 and γ < 0, the policy response has the same sign as the shock, so that, as
anticipated above, interest rates fall after a recessionary shock.5 A myopic or impatient CB
fully accomodates the shock: if β = 0, then κ(ξ) = 1 and i = −e/γ ≡ iFA. In this case the
CB chooses to keep the time-1 output gap constant at zero: the future gap will be negative,
but the CB does not care about it. Full accommodation can also be seen to be optimal if the
spread is a random walk, as ρ = 1 again implies κ = 1. If there is no mean-reversion, the shock
can be fully neutralized without paying any costs at t = 2. More generally, however, the CB
overreacts to the shock:
Result (1) A risk-neutral CB responds aggressively to the shock: (β 6= 0, ρ < 1) imply
κRN(ξ) > 1 and thus iRN < iFA. Furthermore, the policy response is increasing in the absolute
magnitude of the nonlinearity, i.e. decreasing in ξ: ∂κRN(ξ)/∂ξ < 0.
(see Appendix for details). Knowing that the stimulus comes at the cost of a future con-
traction, a risk-neutral CB simply engineers a positive gap today that just compensates for
the (discounted) negative gap that will materialize tomorrow. The existence of a nonlinearity
does not change the nature of this problem: it simply makes the CB more aggressive (provided
of course the condition in footnote 6 continues to hold). This behavior creates of course a lot
of volatility in y  eﬀectively a boom followed by a recession  but by construction the CB
is not concerned about it. A risk-averse (RA) central bank aims instead to minimize the
variance of the output gap around its zero target. The loss function is given in this case by
`RA(e, i) = y21 + βy
2
2. Setting ∂`
RA(e, i)/∂i = 0 gives the following unique solution:
iRA = −1
γ
 1
1 + β(1− ρ)2
(
1 + ξ
γ
)2
 e ≡ −κRA(ξ)
γ
e
5We assume throughout that β(1− ρ) (1 + ξ/γ) < 1 so that the problem is well-behaved.
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(see again the annex for details). For a myopic central bank, or one that faces random-walk
spreads, κRA(ξ) = 1 = κRN(ξ), so the solution is again full accommodation, iFA = −e/γ. In
this case, however, if we move away from those extremes we ﬁnd that the CB accommodates
the shock only in part:
Result (2) A risk-averse CB responds mildly to the shock: (β 6= 0, ρ < 1) imply κRA(ξ) < 1
and thus iRA > iFA. Furthermore, the policy response is decreasing in the absolute magnitude
of the nonlinearity, i.e. increasing in ξ: ∂κRA(ξ)/∂ξ > 0.
Note ﬁrst that κRA(0) = (1+β(1−ρ)2)−1 < 1. Even in a linear world (ξ = 0) mean-reverting
credit spreads create a cost in terms of volatility that a risk-averse CB naturally takes into
account when taking its decision. The mean-variance trade-oﬀ is such that, in general, the CB
accepts a negative average gap for the sake of keeping volatility under control. Furthermore,
the shape of the trade-oﬀ is a function of the nonlinearity. The larger is ξ in absolute terms
(i.e. the lower is ξ < 0), the larger is the cost in terms of variance that must be paid to stabilise
today's output gap, and the lower is κRA(ξ).
The two messages delivered by this example can be summarised in the following terms.
First, mean reversion in credit spreads creates by itself a mean-variance trade-oﬀ that makes
a risk-averse central bank more cautious in tackling negative economic shocks. A full accom-
modation of the shock is generally suboptimal for a risk-averse authority. Second, the terms
of the trade-oﬀ, and the optimal degree of accomodation, depend on the structure of the econ-
omy. The CB's incentive to counter recessionary shocks is weaker if a reversal in spreads has a
stronger impact on the economy than their initial fall. This provides an intuitive formalization
of Stein's (2014) dark side argument.
3 Data
We focus on the United States and use the corporate bond spreads and the excess bond premium
calculated by (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012), GZ henceforth, as our main proxy of credit
market conditions.6 GZ use data on corporate bonds traded in the secondary markets to
construct prices of risk-free securities whose maturities match exactly those of the underlying
corporate bonds. This is achieved by simply discounting the cash ﬂows attached to these
bonds by the risk-free rates implied in the yield curve at the corresponding maturity. The
diﬀerence between the yields on the risky corporate bonds and those on the synthetic risk-free
securities is an exact measure of the cost faced by each company in excess of the risk-free rate
for the maturity at which the bond was issued. Using regression analysis GZ further split
6In Section 7 we test the robustness of our results to alternative ﬁnancial indicators and in the Annex we
replicate the analysis for the euro zone and its largest countries.
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this ﬁrm/bond speciﬁc credit spread into two orthogonal components. The ﬁrst one is the
component that can be predicted on the basis of (i) a ﬁrm speciﬁc measure of expected default
and (ii) a set of macroeconomic factors capturing the interest rates term structure, while the
second one (the Excess Bond Premium', or EBP) is a residual that measures the excess return
investors expect to earn controlling for credit risk. A simple cross-sectional average of these
two variables then provides economy-wide measures of expected credit spread and EBP.7
From our perspective these indicators have two important advantages. First, they are the-
oretically appealing, as they do not suﬀer from the maturity mismatch that plagues commonly
used measures like the diﬀerence between yields on BAA bonds and a given benchmark risk-
free rate. Also notice that, by not confounding risk premia with term premia, they embody
more accurately the risk-taking eﬀect prompted my monetary policy. Second, the spread (and
particularly EBP) has been found to have signiﬁcant predictive power over future economic
activity. By using them we can test for non-linearities in a set-up where we are fairly conﬁdent
of a baseline (linear) eﬀect going from current ﬁnancial conditions to future economic activity.8
The expected spread component and EBP are displayed in Figure 1, together with a plain
BAA-over-AAA bond spread calculated by Moody's. All measures present (albeit to a diﬀerent
extent) a cyclical proﬁle and a remarkable increase at the onset of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
In terms of economic activity indicators we rely on a set of standard measures and analyze
the industrial production index, non farm payroll employment and the unemployment rate.
4 Nonlinear predictive regressions
We ﬁrst study the relation between bond spreads and economic activity through a set of
reduced-form predictive regressions that take the following form:
∇hYt+h = a(L)∆Yt + β2termt + β3realrt + β3 ˆSGZt + β4EBPt + β5EBP+t + t+h
where the dependent variable ∇hYt+h is the percentage change (cumulated) between t and
t + h of economic activity, the term a(L)∆Yt is a distributed lag of the percentage change of
the dependent variable, termt is the term spread, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the three-
month constant-maturity Treasury yield and the ten-year constant-maturity yield and realrt
is the short term real interest rate. The term ˆSGZt is the predicted GZ spread, i.e. the fraction
of spreads that is attributable to the expected default component (see Gilchrist and Zakrajsek,
2012, for details), and EBPt is the Excess Bond Premium. In this regression we allow for this
7Analogous measures have been constructed for the euro area, Germany, France and Italy, by Gilchrist
and Mojon (2014), who do not however provide a decomposition of the spreads into a predictable and an
unpredictable component.
8A third advantage, which we exploit in the extensions that look at the euro area, is the cross-country
comparability of the spreads calculated by GZ and Gilchrist and Mojon (2014).
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last variable, the EBP, to have a potentially asymmetric eﬀect on economic activity through
a local peak transformation (the term EBP+t ) that isolates positive changes of the spread and
sets to zero (i) decreases and (ii) mild/temporary increases. More formally, for the generic
variable xt, the local peak function is deﬁned as follows:
x+t (h) = xtI[xt > max(xt−1, xt−2, xt−3, ..., xt−h)]
where x+t (h) equals 0 if xt is not a peak over the past h periods, xt otherwise. By introducing
EBP+t in the regressions we can capture shifts in the correlation between spreads and output
that take place when EBPt reaches a local maximum.
9 Note the maximum can be reached
either because the spread rises consistently for h periods and/or because a large shock sud-
denly pushes it above its recent historical values. The constant h determines how persistent
the shock to the EBP has to be for this additional regressor to be active, i.e. diﬀerent from
zero. With h = 1 any increase in EBP qualiﬁes as a local peak, so that EBP+t = EBPt when-
ever EBPt > EBPt−1 (and EBP+t = 0 otherwise). As h increases, non-zero values of EBP
+
t
become progressively less frequent, capturing only large/persistent movements in spreads. The
economic rationale for using this transformation is that small, temporary shocks to credit
conditions can be more easily smoothed out by ﬁrms through proﬁt margins, while large or
persistent changes in the cost of credit are more likely to aﬀect investment and output. In this
setup, a test for asymmetric eﬀects is that the coeﬃcient β5, associated with EBP
+
t in the
above regression, is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This approach to testing for asymmetries
has a long tradition in applied econometrics, having been extensively used for instance to test
for the asymmetric eﬀects of oil price shocks on economic activity and inﬂation, see e.g. Boren-
stein et al. (1997) and Meyler (2009) for a review. Its methodological limitations are discussed
by Kilian and Vigfusson (2013).10
The results obtained from these predictive models are reported in Table 1. The table collects
a range of speciﬁcations that diﬀer along three dimensions: (i) the lags to be considered when
computing local peaks for the credit spread (from 12 to 36); (ii) the forecasting horizon (from
6 to 18 months ahead); and (iii) the measure of economic activity used as forecasting target
(Employment, Industrial Production, Unemployment rate). Readers that are familiar with
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) will recognize that our regressions simply augment their basic
9For a visual impression of what the EBP+ transformation looks like, see the top panel of Figure ??. This
is discussed in greater detail in Section 7.4.
10Kilian and Vigfusson (2013) show that in the presence of censored variables (like EBP+t ) reduced-form
regression coeﬃcients can give a very distorted view of whether or not shocks are transmitted asymmetrically,
and that, since the IRFs are a complex nonlinear function of the parameters, the bias can go either way (small
coeﬃcients on the asymmetric terms can coexist with signiﬁcant dynamic asymmetries, and large coeﬃcients
do not necessarily imply that such an asymmetry exists). The structural multivariate models introduced in
Section 5 clearly are not subject to this problem.
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setup with the local peak variables EBP+t . Hence, it does not come as a surprise that EPB
turns out to be a signiﬁcant predictor of economic activity. This result is robust to diﬀerent
forecast horizons and it emerges for all the measures of real activity we consider. Furthermore,
all the coeﬃcients in the regressions display the expected sign, so that an increase in the real
rate of interest, a rise in credit spreads (either in its predicted component or in EBP) and a
ﬂattening of the yield curve are associated to a future economic contraction.
The key object of interest is of course EBP+t . In the case of industrial production, we
ﬁnd its coeﬃcient to be highly signiﬁcant for all horizons and for all speciﬁcations of the local
peak function. For employment and unemployment the coeﬃcient is again signiﬁcant as long
as one focuses on large values of h (i.e. large and persistent increases in credit spreads) and
on forecasting horizons of 12 months or more. These regression results conﬁrm and extend
the evidence presented in Stein (2014), where a similar predictive exercise is conducted on
a diﬀerent sample and focusing on GDP growth. All in all, the balance of evidence clearly
supports the notion that credit spreads move more ahead of negative cyclical phases. As we
noted in section 2, this ﬁnding might arise because ﬁnancial markets anticipate recessions or
because negative ﬁnancial shocks have a stronger eﬀect on economic activity. In the next two
sections we turn to structural analysis to discriminate between these two possibilities.
5 Multivariate structural models
Are the correlations documented in the previous section a symptom that credit markets have
a nonlinear impact on economic activity? In order to answer this question one needs to resort
to a multivariate model that captures the feedbacks between the two and permits a structural
identiﬁcation of the primitive shocks of interest. To that end, we augment an ordinary VAR
with local peaks of the endogenous variables. More formally, we work with the following system
of equations:
yt+h = a
h +
p−1∑
i=0
Bhi yt−i + Θ
hLy+t + vt+h (1)
where a set of endogenous variables yt are regressed onto themselves lagged from h to h +
p periods and on their local peak transformations y+t . The matrix L is a selection matrix
with all zeros, except for the column corresponding to the position of the variable that enters
asymmetrically.11 The local projections method of Jorda (2005) can be promptly used to
calculate generic impulse-response functions in this context. In particular, as we show in
11For example, in a bivariate model allowing for asymmetric eﬀects of the second variable in the ﬁrst equation
we have L =
(
0 1
0 0
)
, so that Ly+t =
(
y+2,t
0
)
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Appendix C, in this case the IRF can be computed directly as:
IRF (h, t) = Bh0di + Θ
hLy˜t (2)
where
y˜t = [(yt + di)
+ − y+t ]
and di is a shock to the i
th variable in the system. Such a shock can be given a structural
interpretation on the basis of identifying restrictions, akin to the ones used in the structural
VAR literature. Crucially, notice that in the ﬁrst term in y˜t the net increase function is applied
to the sum of the historical value of yt at time t and the shocks vector di. This makes the
IRF dependent on the history of the variable and on both the sign and the size of the shock.
This feature makes more explicit the nonlinearity of the eﬀect of a shock in a system in which
there are censored variables, further motivating the use of multivariate models to complement
our baseline regression analysis. In our baseline speciﬁcation the yt vector includes economic
activity (measured again by industrial production, employment or the unemployment rate),
EBP, term spread, (log) CPI index and the interest rate on one-year government bonds. We
later extend the analysis to include alternative credit indicators and measures of volatility and
sentiment. By altering the deﬁnition of L, and by adopting a suitable identiﬁcation strategy
for the primitive shocks, we can use this framework to separately examine the two possibilities
laid out in the introduction to the paper.12
The ﬁrst and most important possibility, which we discuss in Section 6.1, is that output
responds asymmetrically to variations in credit spreads (conjecture (i)). In this case, the L
matrix has an entry equal to 1 in the position that corresponds to the spread term in the output
equation. This nonlinearity could be triggered in principle by any variation in spreads that
does not merely reﬂect an expected change in the business cycle. We identify such variations
in two alternative ways. We focus primarily on variations in spreads that are directly caused
by monetary decisions, for two reasons: ﬁrst, these are clearly the most relevant for the dark
side mechanism; second, they can be reliably identiﬁed using high-frequency data and external
instruments (Gertler and Karadi (2015); see also Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and
Ravn (2013)). The methodology consists of three steps. First, we estimate the vector of
the reduced form residuals from the OLS regressions of the multivariate model, in our case
obtained by local projections. Second, we instrument the residual of the interest rate equation
(for which we use the one-year government bond rate) with the monetary surprise, using 1
month fed fund future rates, 3 month fed fund future rates and Euro/Dollar deposits 2, 3, and
12Testing these mechanisms one at a time is both convenient and, in our view, more informative. Introducing
more than one nonlinearity at the same time would complicate the estimation of the model and the interpretation
of the results and probably weaken the inference.
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4 months ahead. Third, we estimate the contemporaneous response of the remaining variables
to the ﬁtted values obtained in the ﬁrst stage. This identiﬁcation strategy is attractive in
our context because, unlike recursive identiﬁcation, it deals well with simultaneity problems
(monetary conditions might also respond to ﬁnancial developments within the month) and with
the fast response of ﬁnancial markets to central banks' decisions (an issue that is likely to be
particularly important for the unconventional monetary interventions undertaken by the Fed
after the Global Financial Crisis). The approach has a third important advantage: by looking
at the variation in one-year bond rates following a monetary surprise we can capture at least
in part the impact of policy shocks on the term structure of interest rates, thus accounting for
forward guidance.13
Although monetary surprises are central to the dark side argument, their impact on credit
spreads might conceivably be too feeble to identify (potential) nonlinearities in the data. As
an alternative, we thus also look at variations in credit spreads that are only orthogonalized
with respect to the state of the business cycle. In this case we use a simple exclusion restric-
tion that rules out a contemporaneous response of economic activity to unpredictable changes
in EBP, thus classifying as spread shocks all variations in EBP that have a causal impact
on the real economy rather than being an endogenous response to business cycle conditions.
This set eﬀectively contains linear combinations of all the structural shocks that do not aﬀect
economic activity in the month when they materialize (including term spread, monetary policy
or credit supply shocks stemming from changes in risk preferences). The underlying variations
in spreads are by construction larger and more frequent than those stemming exclusively from
monetary shocks.14Hence, this identiﬁcation strategy takes us a step away from the theoretical
argument but it increases our power to detect a non-linearity in the relation between spreads
and economic activity.
The second possibility for a policy trade-oﬀ to arise is if credit spreads respond asymmet-
rically to monetary shocks (conjecture (ii) in the introduction). If the linkage between credit
markets and the rest of the economy is in itself linear, but the way markets respond to monetary
decisions is not, central banks face again a situation where temporary stimulus creates a cost in
terms of macroeconomic variance in the longer term. This mechanism is conceptually diﬀerent
from the previous one, but it can be easily accommodated within our set-up. We simply adjust
the L matrix so that a shock to the policy measure translates into eﬀects on the credit spread
indicator, i.e. the EBP. The only source of shocks of interest in this case is monetary policy,
13The one-year bond rate is our preferred policy measure because it strikes a good balance between (i) being
suﬃciently sensitive to monetary surprises (so that the instruments are valid), and (ii) accounting for term
structure (i.e. forward guidance) eﬀects. See Gertler and Karadi (2015) for details.
14Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) use a recursively-identiﬁed linear VAR and ﬁnd that almost 75% of the
variance of EBP is explained by exogenous credit shocks; Furlanetto et al. (2014) employ VARs with sign
restrictions and conclude that uncertainty and housing are important drivers of EBP.
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for which we can rely on the external instrument identiﬁcation strategy sketched above. The
results of this analysis are discussed in Section 6.2.
6 The implications of credit and monetary policy shocks
6.1 Does output respond asymmetrically to credit spreads?
The ﬁrst proposition we examine is whether an increase in spreads triggered by an unexpected
monetary tightening  identiﬁed as in Gertler and Karadi (2015)  causes a disproportionately
large response in economic activity. We consider a parsimonious speciﬁcation of the model
that includes economic activity (variously deﬁned), CPI, short term rates, term spread and
EBP. The local peaks in EBP are deﬁned as in the regressions discussed in Section 4, and
they are calculated based on the behavior of the spreads over the 12 months prior to the shock
(h = 12).15
The responses generated by the model are displayed in Figure 2. The plots are organized
as follows. Each row refers to a diﬀerent measure of economic activity, i.e., moving down
from the top, employment, industrial production or the unemployment rate. From left to
right, responses to shocks of increasing size are plotted, from 25 to 100 basis points. Within
each plot, the black line represents the estimated median responses to a restrictive monetary
shock (i.e. an increase in the oneyear government bond rate) and the red line represents
the response to an expansionary shock of the same size. The latter are multiplied by minus
one to facilitate the visual comparison of the eﬀects of positive and negative shocks. In all
cases the median estimated response is accompanied by 68% and 90% conﬁdence intervals
(displayed respectively as dark and light grey areas). A positive 25 basis point shock produces
a contraction in employment and industrial production and an increase in the unemployment
rate. These eﬀects are persistent and highly signiﬁcant. However, the IRFs to a positive and a
negative shock overlap almost perfectly: there is no evidence that contractionary shocks have a
larger impact on economic activity. One could suspect that this result is caused by the modest
size of the shock, but it turns out that this is not the case. If we condition on shocks of 50 or
100 basis points (column 2 and 3), the estimated responses naturally become larger but the
equivalence of positive and (inverted) negative shocks is conﬁrmed for all forecasting horizons.
As a next step, we check whether this conclusion holds when we broaden the picture, moving
from monetary shocks to a more encompassing class of credit shocks. As we note in Section
5, by considering a more volatile source of variations in credit spreads we might gain power in
identifying a potential nonlinearity in the linkage between credit markets and the real economy.
We use the same model as above, but in this case we focus on EBP shocks and we rely on
15As we show in Section 7, the results obtained in this set-up are robust to various modiﬁcations and extensions
of the benchmark speciﬁcation.
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a recursive identiﬁcation scheme: we simply assume that economic activity responds with a
lag to an exogenous variation in EBP (an assumption that is fairly standard in the literature,
and seem fairly plausible with monthly data). Figure 3 shows the eﬀects of a shock to EBP
on output. The ﬁgure has the same structure as the previous one. In this case the black line
represents the median response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase in tensions on credit markets
captured by a rise in EBP, while the red line represents the response to a negative shock, i.e. a
fall in EBP. Two considerations are in order. First, although in this case the contemporaneous
responses are zero by construction given our identiﬁcation assumptions, the peak responses
are somewhat larger than those shown in ﬁgure 2. This suggests that some of the primitive
shocks captured in this exercise (variations in risk preferences being an interesting candidate)
are relatively more powerful than the monetary policy shocks we examined earlier.16 Second, in
this case the size of the shock plays some role in driving the asymmetry. The overlap between
positive and negative shocks is again perfect for 25bps shocks (ﬁrst column), but in the case
of 100bps shocks the median responses tend to be larger when EBP rises (third column). The
statistical signiﬁcance of these diﬀerences is however very low. Our interpretation of the results
is that the data does contain episodes where spikes in EBP caused relatively large economic
contractions, but these are (a) too rare to generate a signiﬁcant nonlinearity, and (b) in any
case unrelated to monetary surprises.
6.2 Do credit spreads respond asymmetrically to monetary shocks?
There is another situation where a trade-oﬀ for monetary policy may arise: that is the case
where, although the linkage between credit markets and economic activity is in itself linear, the
reaction by credit markets to monetary surprises is not. This conﬁgures a scenario where the
risk oﬀ phase triggered by a negative (i.e. contractionary) monetary shock is more dramatic
or more abrupt that the risk on phase; in other words, investors buy risk gradually but
tend to ooad it quickly when monetary conditions tighten. Such an asymmetry could be
generated by the presence of levered investors subject to funding constraints (Brunnermeier
and Sannikov, 2014). Its empirical relevance has been documented for currency markets, where
the conventional wisdom that exchange rates go up by the stairs and down in the elevator is
supported by formal econometric evidence (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). Our data and set up
allow us to test its relevance in the case of corporate bond markets.
In Figure 4 we show the dynamic response of EBP to a monetary policy shock identiﬁed by
means of external instruments. As in the previous case, the three columns report the responses
associated to shocks of diﬀerent size. The rows refer instead to speciﬁcations based on our
three measures of economic activity. The dynamics in EBP are clearly very similar across
speciﬁcations. The behavior of the spread is consistent with that documented by Gertler and
16This comparison is a sensible one because we are comparing variations in EBP of the same absolute size
(all shocks are deﬁned in terms of basis points rather than standard deviations)
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Karadi (2015): EBP increases signiﬁcantly on impact and remains positive for over a year after
the shock. This result adds to the existing evidence in support of a market-based risk-taking
channel for monetary policy in the US. Our model also allows us to make statements concerning
the way markets adjust to shocks of diﬀerent size and direction. In short, neither of the two
dimensions matters. Moving across the columns of 4, one clearly sees that the response by EBP
is linear in the size of the monetary shock, irrespective of which economic activity indicator is
used in the model. Furthermore, red and gray bands overlap almost perfectly, implying that the
response of EBP to contractionary and expansionary shocks of a given size are nearly identical.
Taken together, our results thus exclude both (a) the possibility that credit conditions move
more in response to a tightening by the Fed, and (b) the possibility that the market response
is identical but its impact on the real implications is higher when spreads move upwards.
7 Robustness
In this Section we extend our baseline analysis in ﬁve dimensions, considering in turn: the
role of economic uncertainty in the transmission of the shocks; broader ﬁnancial conditions
indicators; the nature of the transmission during recessionary episodes; alternative indicators
of nonlinearities; a recursive identiﬁcation for monetary shocks. The model speciﬁcations used
in this extensions are summarized for reference in Table 2.17
7.1 Accounting for uncertainty and consumer conﬁdence
In the aftermath of the Global Financial crisis there has been a growing interest in evaluating
the eﬀects of uncertainty on the business cycle (see the survey in Bloom, 2014; Caggiano
et al., 2014, among others, analyze the implications of diﬀerent states of the economy for the
transmission of uncertainty shocks). The literature shows that a higher degree of uncertainty
can not only directly aﬀect economic activity and inﬂation, but it may also interact with
the transmission of ﬁnancial shocks to the real sector. In particular, Caldara et al. (2015)
recommend to simultaneously identify uncertainty and ﬁnancial shocks in order to properly
disentangle their relevance as drivers of economic ﬂuctuations. Although we are not interested
in identifying the eﬀects of uncertainty per se, the interaction between uncertainty and credit
conditions might play a role in our case too. Hence, in models 4 , 8 and 12 of Table 2 we
include uncertainty among the controls. We capture it in two ways. The ﬁrst one is the
measure recently proposed by Jurado et al. (2015), who use a datarich environment approach
to estimate a measure ofmacroeconomic uncertainty, showing that this outperforms comparable
indicators of volatility used by the literature in both forecasting and structural models. The
17In the robustness analysis we focus for brevity on monetary policy shocks only. The empirical ﬁndings
related to credit (EBP) shocks are also robust along these dimensions (the results are available upon request).
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second one is consumer conﬁdence measured by the Michigan Index of consumer conﬁdence, a
widely-used series in the literature on expectations, news and conﬁdence shocks (Barsky and
Sims, 2011, 2012). The forwardlooking nature of this indicator can be particularly useful in
multivariate models, as it adds nontrivial information which would otherwise be unaccessible
to the econometrician.18 Results are presented in Figures 5, 6 and 7, each for a diﬀerent
deﬁnition of nonlinear indicator (see Section 7.4 for more details). In spite of some increase
in the distance between the median estimates of iRFs to expansionary and contractionary
monetary policy shocks, the conﬁdence bands do overlap, thus validating the main conclusion
of the baseline speciﬁcation: no evidence of asymmetries is visible. Uncertainty and consumer
conﬁdence do not seem to alter the transmission of monetary policy through credit spreads,
and do not change the general conclusions of our analysis.
7.2 Alternative indicators of ﬁnancial distress
Up to this point, we have focused on the EBP as the variable through which the policy trade
oﬀ described by Stein (2014) may arises. This choice is motivated not only because of the
willingness to resemble as close as possible to the equation estimated by Stein (2014), but also
because of the relevance of credit markets  in particular credit spreads  in explaining the
crisis of 200709. However, despite this evidence, one may argue that other ﬁnancial variables
may trigger some nonlinear relation with economic activity (see, for example, Adrian et al.,
2015; Hubrich and Tetlow, 2015). To evaluate this possibility, we replace the EBP with the
Chicago Financial Condition Index, which measures periods of ﬁnancial stress by extracting
a synthetic indicator from a number of ﬁnancial variables, providing a comprehensive update
on U.S. ﬁnancial conditions in money markets, debt and equity markets and the traditional
and shadow banking systems. Results are reported in Figures 1214, respectively showing
the dynamic eﬀects of monetary policy shocks identiﬁed by external instruments and Choleski
decomposition (see Section 7.5). In both cases, the eﬀects of monetary easing and tightening
are not statistically distinguishable from each other. Thus, we tend to exclude the possibility
of money or equity activating the dark side of monetary policy, inducing asymmetric eﬀects on
economic activity.
7.3 The role of recessions
There is a growing body of papers evaluating the eﬀects of monetary policy in diﬀerent phases
of the business cycle. For example, Santoro et al. (2014) ﬁnd that monetary policy exerts
18Volatility and conﬁdence are introduced jointly into the model; the ﬁndings do not change if they are used
one at a time.
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asymmetric eﬀects on output over contractions and expansions in economic activity. They
explain this evidence with higher responsiveness of output to interest rate changes, as well
as a ﬂatter aggregate supply schedule faced by the central bank during contractions. Also,
Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) estimate the impulse response of a number of US macro series
to the monetary policy shocks, allowing the response to vary over the state of the business cycle,
ﬁnding that contractionary policy shocks have more powerful eﬀects than expansionary shocks.
Although we do not develop here a formal statedependent model, our framework allows us to
condition the estimate of our IRFs over periods of recessions, instead of taking into account
the whole history of economic activity. A recession is deﬁned as a period in which the y-o-y
growth rate of employment, industrial production or unemployment rate is negative (positive
for the latter). Remember that the IRFs depend not only on the size and on the sign of the
shock, as evident from the results presented so far, but also on the history of the variable that
is being shocked, as explained in section 5. While the results shown in Figure 2 are obtained
conditioning on the mean value of the endogenous variables, it could be interesting to look
at IRFs obtained conditional on a particular state of the economy. Of particular interest, for
example, are the periods in which economic activity has persistently fallen. Restricting the
analysis to these subsamples can shed some light on the issue of whether asymmetric eﬀects
are more evident in bad, rather than in normal, times as suggested, for instance, by Tenreyro
and Thwaites (2016). In this case, too, no evidence of asymmetries is detected (see Figure 8,
when using the local peak indicator for the term EBP+, whereas Figures 1011 for alternative
deﬁnitions of nonlinear indicators (see also section 7.4).
7.4 Alternative deﬁnitions of nonlinearities
Our analysis relies on the identiﬁcation of exceptional increases in bond spreads, which is
clearly arbitrary to some extent. With respect to the baseline deﬁnition of EBP+ employed
thus far, two alternative options can be considered: (i) the horizon over which the net increase
is computed and (ii) the type of nonlinear function underlying the calculation. As for the ﬁrst
dimension, we compute our local peaks over a period of 24 and 36 months instead of 12 as in
the baseline case. The results, not reported here in order to save space, are qualitatively and
quantitatively unaﬀected. Moving to alternative indicators of non linearities, we propose and
use two formulations. The ﬁrst one, labeled S − diff , is deﬁned as x+t (j) = (xt − xt−h)I[xt −
xt−h > 0]. Here the net increase is activated every time the change in EBP is positive over the
last j = t − h periods (where, again, we choose h=12 as baseline). The second one, labeled
S−plus, is deﬁned as x+t = xtI[xt > 0]: this restricts the focus to occurrence of positive excess
bond premia. The indicators are displayed in Figure 9. The ﬁrst panel shows the local peak
function with horizon 12 months used throughout Section 4 and 5; the other two panels refer
18
respectively to S − diff and S − plus. In all three cases, the row EBP series is represented by
the dotted blue line.
Although when using the S − plus deﬁnition there is some weak nonlinear eﬀect, this is
never statistically signiﬁcant. We conclude that the main message of our empirical analysis is
robust to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of non-linearity in EBP. 19
7.5 Recursive identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks
As a ﬁnal check, we run our structural models identifying monetary policy shocks by means of
a recursive (Cholesky) scheme, conventionally used in macroeconomic literature (Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek, 2012; Jurado et al., 2015). We plot the results in Figure 13, referring in particular
to speciﬁcation 4 of Table 2, i.e. the one comprising volatility and consumer conﬁdence. Here
we observe that, for large shocks only (100bp), contractionary monetary policy shocks seem
to exert stronger eﬀects on economic activity than expansionary shocks of equal size. This
is particularly visible for industrial production and the unemployment rate. Although the
nonlinearity shows up more signiﬁcantly in this exercise than in our baseline analysis, the
evidence remains altogether weak, especially considering that this is the only case in which it
is observed. In fact, the emergence of a nonlinearity might in this case be another, indirect
proof that recursive identiﬁcation has serious limitations in this type of problems. The general
limitations of this approach are known, particularly when dealing with ﬁnancial data (Carlstrom
et al., 2009; Gertler and Karadi, 2015). In our case, this identiﬁcation scheme delivers an
asymmetry that (i) resembles that uncovered in the reduced-form regressions of Section 4,
and (ii) is much stronger than that estimated under the (more reliable) assumptions made in
Section 5. This is consistent with the possibility that  like the predictive regressions  the
assumed recursive structure essentially fails to disentangle exogenous variations in EBP from
the (possibly dominant) cases where spreads rise in anticipation of a contraction in economic
activity.
8 Reconciling the evidence from reduced form and struc-
tural models
The empirical evidence presented so far has shown that credit spreads predict recessions more
accurately than expansions, but that the transmission of monetary policy shocks to the real
economy through credit spreads is overall linear. It then remains to be explained why the
results obtained from reduced form models diﬀer from those stemming from structural models.
A ﬁrst line of explanation is purely econometric. In a sense, the diﬀerence between Impulse
Response Functions to identiﬁed structural shocks and regression coeﬃcients in predictive
19The whole set of graphs obtained using the two alternative indicators is available upon request.
19
regressions is similar to the diﬀerence between the estimates obtained on the basis of Instru-
mental Variables (IV) methods and those obtained with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). As
IV estimates correct for possible endogeneity biases, they are likely to diﬀer (not always in a
predictable direction) from those obtained via OLS.
This of course, does not explain the asymmetric predictive ability of credit spreads on
future economic activity. To understand this result an economic, rather than an econometric,
argument must be put forward. As we have discussed in the Introduction a reduced-form
asymmetry can arise simply because investors respond more strongly to negative news on the
macroeconomic outlook. A closer look at this statement reveals that three conditons are needed
for this to be true. First, there must be macroeconomic shocks that (controlling for a number
of covariates like those used in our predictive regression framework) anticipate future economic
activity. Second, these shocks must have an asymmetric impact on credit spreads. Third
they must be orthogonal to the monetary policy shock on which we have based the structural
analysis presented in Section 6.
In this Section we provide some evidence that this economic explanation can indeed be
substantiated in our setup and in our data sample. To this end we resort to a measure of
macroeconomic news. For every month t, this is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the unem-
ployment rate update published in month t and the median unemployment expectation held
by market participants the day before the data release.20
The ﬁnancial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers was characterized by a
stream of bad news, while during the cyclical upswing that followed the crisis the markets
underestimated the pace of recovery of the unemployment rate. This type of macroeconomic
`'surprises are very popular in the asset pricing empirical literature, (see for instance Gürkay-
nak et al., 2005; Faust et al., 2007; Goldberg and Grisse, 2013) and are known to be signiﬁcant
movers of ﬁnancial market prices.
We start from the ﬁrst part of the argument, that is we show that this macroeconomic
news has predictive ability over future economic activity over and above the standard set of
macroeconomics controls that were used in the predictive regressions in Section XX. To this
end we run dynamic regressions of this type:
∇hYt+h = a(L)∆Yt + Γ′xt + βUnewst + t+h (3)
where Y is either the Unemployment rate or Industrial Production or Employment, xt is a
vector of macroeconomic controls (namely term spread, real fund rates and credit spreads)
and Unewst is the unemployment rate news. Table 3 reports the t-statistics associated with
the coeﬃcient β in the above equation. First, the statistics have the expected sign, that is
bad unemployment rate news predict higher unemployment and lower IP and employment 6,
20Data on these surprises are taken from Bloomberg.
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12 and 18 months ahead. Second, they are all (but one) higher than 1.95 in absolute value,
indicating that the estimated coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Second, we need to show that credit spreads react more to bad than to good news. To this
end we estimate the following equation:
EBPt = α + Γ
′zt + βbadUnewst I(U
news
t > 0) + β
goodUnewst I(U
news
t ≤ 0) + ut (4)
where zt is a vector of macroeconomic controls (namely term spread, real fund rates, predicted
GZ spread and lagged unemployment rate). To separate the eﬀects of good and bad unem-
ployment news we inteact the term Unewst with dummy variables that identify periods in which
Unewst is, respectively, positive (bad news) and negative (good news). The ﬁrst two columns in
Table 4 show the results obtained from the estimation of equation (3) omitting the vector zt.
The results show that while βbad is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, βgood is not, that is, the
Excess Bond Premium tightens signiﬁcantly in response to bad macroeconomic news, but is
overall unresponsive to good news. The latter two columns show that this result holds when
we add macroeconomic controls zt to this regression.
To close our argument we need to check that indeed the macro news we are considering are
orthogonal to Monetary Policy Shocks. We do this by running the following regression
Unewst = α + βMPsuprise + ut (5)
As Table 5 shows, the estimated coeﬃcient β is not diﬀerent from zero, indicating that two
news are indeed orthogonal to each other.
9 Conclusions
Monetary policy exerts a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on market risk premia. If this part of the trans-
mission mechanism is asymmetric, so that credit spreads have a stronger impact on output
when they rise than when they decline, monetary authorities may face a delicate trade-oﬀ:
monetary stimulus might ease credit conditions and close the output gap in the short run, but
also increase the risk of a costly reversal in market sentiment in the longer term (Stein, 2014).
We ﬁrst discuss the conditions under which this problem arises, using a simple analytical ex-
ample to illustrate why the policy trade-oﬀ is indeed steeper if the link between credit markets
and output is asymmetric. We then exploit the dataset constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012) to develop a thorough econometric investigation of the relation between monetary policy,
credit spreads and economic activity in the US. Reduced-form predictive regressions suggest
that corporate bond spreads systematically experience a sharp rise ahead of a slowdown in
economic activity. Crucially, though, this asymmetry has little to do with monetary policy.
Monetary shocks  which we identify adopting the external instrument strategy of Gertler and
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Karadi (2015)  do not have an asymmetric impact either on ﬁnancial markets or on economic
activity: on the contrary, bond spreads, industrial production, employment and unemploy-
ment all display dynamics that are perfectly symmetric to contractions and expansions in the
monetary stance. These results suggest that the asymmetry is best interpreted as a predictive
rather than a causal relation, which arises because bond markets tend to rise dramatically in
anticipation of a worsening in the macroeconomic outlook. Since this phenomenon does not
depend on the monetary stance, central banks should not be overly concerned about their
decisions causing spikes in risk premia and unnecessary economic volatility. To the extent that
our identiﬁcation strategy successfully captures the impact of forward guidance, this conclusion
directly applies to the current US outlook, and it suggests that the liftoﬀ from the prolonged
monetary expansion implemented by the Fed should not come at a cost that is so high as to
raise doubts on whether the stimulus was worth undertaking in the ﬁrst place. A few caveats
are in order. Nonlinearities are generally elusive, and it is possible that the asymmetry between
credit conditions and output is conﬁned to particular states of the economy  such as those
where private debt is excessive, uncertainty is high, or nominal interest rates are constrained
by the Zero Lower Bound. A more thorough investigation of these possibilities is left to future
research.
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Tables
Table 1: Credit spreads, economic activity and nonlinearities: USA
Order of local peak 12 24 36
Forecast horizon 6 12 18 6 12 18 6 12 18
Employment
Term Spread -0.09 -0.19 -0.31 -0.09 -0.21 -0.30 -0.09 -0.19 -0.31
p-val 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.02
Real Fed Funds 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.14
p-val 0.20 0.37 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.30 0.24
Predicted GZ spread -0.10 -0.13 -0.21 -0.10 -0.13 -0.20 -0.09 -0.12 -0.20
p-val 0.11 0.33 0.21 0.11 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.32 0.20
EBP -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.18 -0.17 -0.14 -0.17 -0.17
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EBP+ -0.13 -0.20 -0.21 -0.14 -0.23 -0.24 -0.16 -0.25 -0.25
p-val 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.01
R2 0.76 0.65 0.56 0.76 0.64 0.56 0.76 0.65 0.56
Industrial production
Term Spread -0.06 -0.11 -0.19 -0.06 -0.11 -0.19 -0.06 -0.11 -0.19
p-val 0.22 0.29 0.17 0.26 0.39 0.14 0.24 0.39 0.11
Real Fed Funds 0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.06
p-val 0.89 0.97 0.58 0.83 0.93 0.54 0.81 0.92 0.53
Predicted GZ spread -0.13 -0.16 -0.24 -0.12 -0.16 -0.24 -0.12 -0.16 -0.24
p-val 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.02
EBP -0.20 -0.19 -0.15 -0.21 -0.20 -0.16 -0.21 -0.20 -0.16
p-val 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.07
EBP+ -0.22 -0.29 -0.22 -0.26 -0.33 -0.26 -0.26 -0.34 -0.26
p-val 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
R2 0.45 0.35 0.26 0.46 0.36 0.26 0.46 0.36 0.26
Unemployment rate
Term Spread 0.12 0.25 0.36 0.12 0.25 0.35 0.12 0.25 0.35
p-val 0.07 0.03 0.77 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.48
Real Fed Funds -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03
p-val 0.63 0.76 0.99 0.62 0.74 0.96 0.61 0.70 0.97
Predicted GZ spread 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.16
p-val 0.27 0.48 0.81 0.28 0.47 0.56 0.30 0.48 0.57
EBP 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.24 0.19
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.25
EBP+ 0.09 0.23 0.24 0.13 0.29 0.31 0.16 0.32 0.33
p-val 0.30 0.05 0.86 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.00
R2 0.53 0.44 0.38 0.54 0.44 0.39 0.54 0.45 0.39
Notes: Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:12. Dependent variables is ∇hYt+h, where Yt denotes the respective economic activity variable
in the subpanel title in month t and h is the forecasting horizon. Order of local peak represents the number of periods over
which the asymmetric term of the ﬁnancial variable is computed. Each regressions also include a constant and p lags of the
dependent variable (not reported), where p is chosen by the BIC. Entries in the table denote the standardized estimates of the OLS
coeﬃcients associated with each ﬁnancial indicator, whereas italics terms are the p-values computed by means of the NeweyWest
(1987) correction.
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Table 2: Multivariate model, list of specifications.
History Nonlinearity Variables in the model
1 All Loc. Peaks Output, EBP, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI
4 All Loc. Peaks Output, EBP, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI, Michigan, Volatility
5 All SDiﬀ Output, EBP, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI
8 All SDiﬀ Output, EBP, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI, Michigan, Volatility
9 All SPlus Output, EBP, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI
12 All SPlus Output, EBP, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI, Michigan, Volatility
13 Recessions Loc. Peaks Output, EBP, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI, Michigan, Volatility
14 Recessions SDiﬀ Output, EBP, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI, Michigan, Volatility
15 Recessions SPlus Output, EBP, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI, Michigan, Volatility
16 All Loc. Peaks Output, CFCI, Short Rates, Term Spread, CPI, Michigan, Volatility
Notes: Under the column History we report whether we condition the Impulse Response Functions on the
whole history (All) or on Recession period (Recessions). The latter are deﬁned as periods in which output at
time t is lower than output a year before. Under the column Type of nonlinearity we report the transformation
of the measure of ﬁnancial condition used in the model to account for asymmetries in the transmission of a
shock. The options are (i) local peak, deﬁned as x+t (j) = xtI[xt > max(xt−1, xt−2, ..., xt−j)], (ii) S-diﬀ, deﬁned
as x+t (j) = (xt−xt−h)I[xt−xt−h > 0], (iii) S-minplus, deﬁned as x+t = xtI[xt > 0]. Short Rates are the 1 year
government bond rates in Gertler and Karadi (2015). In the econometric exercise we instrument the innovations
to this rate with the surprise in the three month ahead Fed Funds Futures rate.Since our speciﬁcation is slightly
diﬀerent from the one adopted by Gertler and Karadi (2015) we have analyzed the robustness of this instrument
for the innovation to the 1 year rate. Results, available upon request, conﬁrm that the the three month ahead
Fed Funds Futures rate has good power in explaining the residuals of the 1 year government bond. The term
spread is the diﬀerence between the 10 year government bond rates and the Fed Funds Rates. Michigan is the
Michigan Sentiment Index. Volatility is the measure of Uncertainy computed by Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng
(2015), see Jurado, Kyle, Sydney C. Ludvigson, and Serena Ng. 2015. "Measuring Uncertainty." American
Economic Review, 105(3): 1177-1216.
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Table 3: Predictive Power of Unemployment News on economic activity
Forecast Horizon 6 12 18
Urate 2.91 2.93 2.58
IP -2.50 -2.26 -1.85
Employment -3.04 -2.63 -2.19
Notes: The table reports the t-statistics of the coeﬃcients related to Unewst in equation (3).
Table 4: Reaction of EBP to Bad and Good Unemployment news
W/O controls With controls
β p-val β p-val
Bad News 2.01 0.00 1.41 0.03
Good News -0.45 0.23 -0.41 0.26
Notes: The table reports the t-statistics of the coeﬃcients related to EBPt in equation (4).
Table 5: Unemployment rate and Monetary Policy News
β p-val
Intercept -0.03 0.02
Mon Policy News -0.19 0.25
Notes: The table reports the t-statistics of the coeﬃcients related to Unewst in equation (5).
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Figures
Figure 1: GZ spread, Moody's BAA-AAA spread and Excess Bond Premium
Notes: The ﬁgure compares three diﬀerent indicators of tensions in credit markets, i.e., the GZ spread (red
line), the Moody's spread between Seasoned BAA and AAA Corporate Bond Yield (blue line) and the EBP
(green line). Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 2: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, baseline (Specification 1)
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the policy instrument, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded
area). The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in
the policy instrument, a monetary easing, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red
lines). From left panel to the right increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a
given point in time of the shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample
is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 3: IRFs to a shock to EBP, Cholesky identification, Specification 1
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the policy instrument, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded
area). The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in
the policy instrument, a monetary easing, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red
lines). From left panel to the right increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a
given point in time of the shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample
is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 4: IRFs of EBP to a monetary policy shock, Specification 1
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the policy instrument, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded
area). The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in
the policy instrument, a monetary easing, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red
lines). From left panel to the right increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a
given point in time of the shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample
is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 5: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, Specification 4
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the spreads, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded area).
The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in the
spreads,together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left panel to the right
increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a given point in time of the shocked
variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
34
Figure 6: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, Specification 8
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the spreads, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded area).
The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in the
spreads,together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left panel to the right
increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a given point in time of the shocked
variable and the net increase is computed over a 12months horizon. Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 7: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, Specification 12
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the spreads, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded area).
The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in the
spreads,together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left panel to the right
increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a given point in time of the shocked
variable and the net increase is computed over a 12months horizon. Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 8: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, local peaks, conditioning on re-
cessions (Specification 13)
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the spreads, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded area).
The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in the
spreads,together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left panel to the right
increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a given point in time of the shocked
variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 9: EBP and its transformations capturing asymmetries
(a)
(b)
(c)
Notes: Each subﬁgure plots the EBP (xt) and the related asymmetric indicator built at horizon j
(x+t (j)). The top panel shows the EBP and the local peak transformation, deﬁned as x
+
t (j) = xtI[xt >
max(xt−1, xt−2, ..., xt−j)] with j = 12. The middle panel shows the EBP and the S-diﬀ transformation, deﬁned
as x+t (j) = (xt − xt−h)I[xt − xt−h > 0]. The bottom panel shows the EBP and the S-minplus transformation
deﬁned as x+t = xtI[xt > 0]
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Figure 10: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, S-diff, conditioning on recessions
(Specification 14)
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the spreads, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded area).
The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in the
spreads,together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left panel to the right
increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a given point in time of the shocked
variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 11: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, S-plus, conditioning on recessions
(Specification 15)
25 bp
E m
p l
o y
m
e n
t
10 20 30 40 50 60
−6
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3 50 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−10
−5
0
5
x 10−3 100 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
25 bp
I n
d u
s t
r i a
l  P
r o
d u
c t
i o
n
10 20 30 40 50 60
−10
−5
0
5
x 10−3 50 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
100 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
25 bp
U n
e m
p l
o y
m
e n
t  r
a t
e
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
50 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.5
0
0.5
100 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the spreads, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded area).
The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in the
spreads,together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left panel to the right
increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a given point in time of the shocked
variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 12: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, Chicago FCI as measure of asym-
metries (Specification 16)
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the spreads, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded area).
The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in the
spreads,together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left panel to the right
increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a given point in time of the shocked
variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 13: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, EBP as measure of asymmetries,
measures of volatility and confidence included, Cholesky identification
25 bp
E m
p l
o y
m
e n
t
10 20 30 40 50 60
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3 50 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−10
−5
0
5
x 10−3 100 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
25 bp
I n
d u
s t
r i a
l  P
r o
d u
c t
i o
n
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
50 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
100 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
25 bp
U n
e m
p l
o y
m
e n
t  r
a t
e
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
50 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.5
0
0.5
100 bp
10 20 30 40 50 60
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the spreads, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded area).
The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in the
spreads,together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left panel to the right
increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a given point in time of the shocked
variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Figure 14: IRFs to a monetary policy shock, Chicago FCI as measure of asym-
metries, Cholesky identification
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Notes: The black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an increase
of the spreads, together with its 68% (the dark grey shaded area) and its 90% (the light grey shaded area).
The red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease in the
spreads,together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left panel to the right
increasing sizes of the shocks are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a given point in time of the shocked
variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1973:01 - 2012:10.
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Appendix
A Monetary policy trade-oﬀ in a two-period economy
In Section 2.1 of the paper we examine a stylized two-period economy described by the following
equations:
yt = γ∆st + ξ∆stI∆st>0 + et
∆st = −(1− ρ)st−1 + it
The output gap yt is aﬀected by a random disturbance et and by the variation in credit
spreads relative to the previous period, ∆st. The impact of the spreads on economic activity
is negative (γ < 0) and potentially nonlinear (ξ ≤ 0). The spread equation comes from a
simple AR(1) process st = (1 − ρ)s∗ + ρst−1 + it with s∗ = 0, where the equilibrium value s∗
is set to zero to save notation. We consider an economy that starts oﬀ from an equilibrium
situation where y0 = s0 = 0. At time 1 an exogenous shock e1 takes place, the central bank
(CB) observes it and decides whether and how to tackle it by manipulating i1. No actions and
no further shocks take place at time 2. Conditional on the shock e1, the output gaps at t = 1
and 2 are a known function of the policy response:
y1 = γi1 + ξi1Ii1>0 + e1
y2 = γ∆s2 + ξ∆s2I∆s2>0 = −(1− ρ)i1 (γ + ξIi1<0) ,
where we used the fact that ∆s2 > 0 ⇔ s1 < 0 ⇔ u1 < 0, so I∆s2 > 0 = Iu1<0. In
other words, given the nature of the spread equation, the nonlinearity is triggered for sure in
t = 2 if and only if the policy rate is lowered in t = 1. We assume that the CB discounts the
future gap at a rate β < 1 and focus on a recession e1 < 0 that gives the CB an incentive
to implement monetary stimulus. We consider the optimal policy choice under risk neutrality
and risk aversion.
Risk-neutral central bank. For the risk-neutral (RN) CB, the loss function is the
expected (or average) output gap over the two periods, which can be written as a function
of shock and policy response as follows (the time subscript can be omitted because both are
dated time-1):
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`RN(e, i) = y1 + βy2
= e+ γi+ ξIi>0 − β(1− ρ)(γ + ξIi<0)i
= e+ γi− β(1− ρ)(γ + ξ)i
(The indicator function can be dropped once we focus on e < 0 and thus i < 0). The optimal
policy choice can be derived by simply setting `RN(e, i) = 0 and rearranging the terms:
i = −1
γ
[
1
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + ξ/γ)
]
e ≡ −κ
RN(ξ)
γ
e,
where
κRN(ξ) ≡ 1
1− β(1− ρ)
(
1 + ξ
γ
)
We assume β(1 − ρ)(1 + ξ/γ) < 1 in order to guarantee κRN(ξ) > 0, so that e < 0 always
implies i < 0. 21 Subject to that, one can see that:
i) κRN(ξ) ≥ 1
ii) κRN(ξ) = 1⇔ ρ = 1 or β = 0
iii) κRNξ (ξ) = −
[
1− β(1− ρ)(1 + ξ
γ
)
]−2 −β(1− ρ)
γ
=
1
γ
β(1− ρ)[
[1− β(1− ρ)] (1 + ξ
γ
)
]2 < 0
These are summarised under Result (1) in the paper. With β = 0 or ρ = 1 the CB fully
accomodates the shock, in the sense that it simply keeps the time-1 output gap constant at
zero (ii). The negative time-2 gap is disregarded (β = 0) or it does not arise in the ﬁrst place
if the spread is random walk (ρ = 1). In general, the response goes beyond full accomodation
(i). This multiplier eﬀect arises because, under risk neutrality, the CB chooses a positive gap
in t = 1 that compensates for the discounted negative gap that will materialize in t = 2. The
emergence of a non-linearity in the transmission mechanism makes the CB even more aggressive
in this respect (iii).
Risk-averse central bank Under risk aversion, the CB minimises the variance of the
21The condition is economically sensible  it implies that the policy rate drops (rises) after a negative (positive)
shock  and not overly restrictive. It clearly holds instance if ξ > γ and ρ 6 0.5, as in this cases it is satisﬁed
as long as β < 1. A smaller upper bound for β would be consistent with t = 2 being a shorthand for some
indeﬁnite future period.
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output gap around its zero target:
`RA(e, i) = y21 + βy
2
2
= (e+ γi+ ξIi>0)
2 + β [−(1− ρ)(γ + ξIi<0)i]2
= e2 + 2eγi+
[
γ2 + β(1− ρ)2(γ + ξ)2] i2
The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is:22
`RAi (e, i) = 2eγ + 2[γ
2 + β(1− ρ)2(γ + ξ)2]i = 0
i = − γ
[γ2 + β(1− ρ)2(γ + ξ)2]e
≡ −κ
RA(ξ)
γ
e,
where
κRA(ξ) ≡
 1
1 + β(1− ρ)2
(
1 + ξ
γ
)2

In this case the multiplier has the following properties:
i) κRA(ξ) ≤ 1
ii) κRA(ξ) = 1⇔ ρ = 1 or β = 0
iii) κRAξ (ξ) = −
[
1 + β(1− ρ)2
(
1 +
ξ
γ
)2]−2
2
γ
(
1 +
ξ
γ
)
= −1
γ
2(1 + ξ
γ
)[
1 + β(1− ρ)2
(
1 + ξ
γ
)2]2 > 0,
(where the last inequality in (iii) follows again from γ < 0 and ξ ≤ 0). Risk aversion
generally creates an attenuation eﬀect: relative to the benchmark case of an impatient CB
(or a random-walk spread), the interest rate here moves less (i, ii). That implies a fortiori
that the risk-averse CB acts less then the risk-neutral CB examined above. Furthermore, the
nonlinearity works in the opposite direction compared to the risk neutral case, leading to even
milder policy interventions (iii).
22The second-order condition is satisﬁed so this identiﬁes the global minimum for the loss function.
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B Evidence for euro area and its major countries
In this Appendix we present results of forecasting regressions and structural multivariate models
also for the euro area, France, Germany and Italy. However, the credit spreads available for
these countries are not directly comparable to the EBP, but, instead to the GZ spread. One
has to then keep it in mind when interpreting the results.
B.1 Forecasting regressions
In Tables B-1  B-4 we present the results for the euro area (EA), France, Germany and Italy.
Notice that these tables are organized in four panels. The top two panels show results obtained
using the spreads for non-ﬁnancial corporations (NFC Spread) and relate to, respectively, In-
dustrial Production and the Unemployment rate, while the bottom two refer to the analysis
that related the banking credit spreads (Bank Spread) to the same measures of economic activ-
ity. Also notice that, since for these economies no distinction between predictable and excess
bond premium is available, the baseline predictive regressions are augmented with suitable local
peak transformations of the overall spreads.
Starting from the EA aggregate (Table B-1), we ﬁnd that the NFC spread constructed
by Gilchrist and Mojon (2014) has useful predictive content for both industrial production
and for the unemployment rate at most forecast horizons. As for the Banking spread, on
the other hand, the correlation between current ﬁnancing conditions and future economic
activity is rather weak. Turning to the terms capturing asymmetric eﬀects (NFCSpread+
and BankSpread+) we ﬁnd that in most cases their impact is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
and of the expected sign (i.e. negative in the case of Industrial Production and positive for the
Unemployment rate), indicating that they anticipate recessions more reliably than expansions.
A certain degree of cross-country heterogeneity emerges on the euro area. For France and
Germany (Tables B-2 and B-3) NFC spreads display signiﬁcant predictive content for economic
activity at short-medium horizons. By contrast, in most cases banking spreads do not correlate
signiﬁcantly with future economic activity. For Italy, instead, the relationship between both
NFC and Banking spreads and future economic activity is very strong and robust across forecast
horizons (Table B-4).
Turning to non-linear terms, we ﬁnd that for the French and the German economy, NFC
spreads play a signiﬁcant role in anticipating falls in industrial production, over and above
that implied by the linear terms. Yet this result does not carry over to the unemployment
rate, which is also aﬀected by the behaviour of other sectors, notably Services. All in all
we read this result as suggesting that the impact on the overall economy of these spreads is
essentially symmetric. As for Banking spreads, the null hypothesis of a symmetric eﬀect can
not generally be rejected. In the case of Italy, the non linear terms are almost never associated
with coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
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Given the results for the single countries, a question arises as to how to reconcile the outcome
of the analysis for the euro area as a whole (where evidence of an asymmetric impact of credit
spreads is more pervasive) with those for its largest members, where it is rather episodic.
Ongoing work, aimed at enlarging the pool of countries under analysis to Spain, points to a
clear role for this country in driving the area-wide results.
Summing up, the results of the regression analysis point to the existence of a dark side
of credit spreads in the sense of Stein (2014) and Kocherlakota (2014), in the U.S.. As for
euro-area countries the evidence is more mixed. In particular, for the largest countries the
relationship between spreads and economic activity seems to be linear, with the exception of
sectorial eﬀects in France and Germany. Nonetheless evidence of asymmetries for the area as a
whole does emerge, probably through the impact of other countries that were strongly hit by
the Sovereign Debt crisis.
In interpreting the outcome of this analysis we must keep in mind the two limitations
that were highlighted in Section 3.2.1. First, the predictive power of risk-premia might derive
from an asymmetric response of these prices to current and past bad news on the state of
the economy. Second, inference based on regression coeﬃcients in the presence of censored
regressors might be misleading. In the next sub-section we therefore turn to multivariate
models in which we can trace out the dynamic eﬀect of a structural shock to credit spreads
that is orthogonal to the current state of the economy.
B.2 Multivariate models
Results for the euro area, France, Germany and Italy are presented in Figures B-1 to B-10.
Panels are organized in a similar manner as for the U.S., bearing in mind that for these
economies we only consider two measures of real activity but two diﬀerent spreads. We keep
the comment on these results to a minimum, given that they unequivocally point to the same
conclusions.
Starting from the euro area as a whole (Figures B-1 and B-2), a shock to the NFC spread
generates a fall in the rate of growth of industrial production and an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate. Notice, however, that no clear diﬀerence emerges in response to positive, rather
than negative shocks, regardless of the size of the shock. The response of these variables to
shocks to the Banking spread is imperfectly measured, as the reaction of both the unemploy-
ment rate and of industrial production is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As hinted in the
Introduction this could partly reﬂect a limitation of this set of indicators (due to the fact that
they do not distinguish an ordinary from an excess bond premium). However, it could also
suggest that the asymmetric eﬀects estimated in the predictive regressions in the case of the
euro area do not reﬂect a causal link running from the ﬁnancial to the real sector.
Results for the single countries are essentially in line with those for the euro area as a whole
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as: (i) NFC spread shocks generally exert a stronger eﬀect than Banking spread shocks (ii) no
evidence of non-linear eﬀects emerges.
Wrapping up, when subject to the more stringent test implied by a multivariate structural
econometric setup, the evidence of asymmetric response of economic activity to unexpected
changes in risk-premia turns out to be conﬁned to the case of large, episodic shocks, of the
type observed in the U.S. during the Great Financial Crisis.
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Table B-1: Credit spreads, economic activity and nonlinearities: Euro Area
Order of local peak 12 24 36 36
Forecast horizon 6 12 18 6 12 18 6 12 18
Industrial production
Term Spread -0.57 -0.63 -0.61 -0.57 -0.63 -0.60 -0.55 -0.63 -0.61
p-val 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02
Real EONIA 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.12
p-val 0.27 0.27 0.67 0.26 0.26 0.66 0.25 0.27 0.62
NFC Spread -0.47 -0.25 -0.23 -0.46 -0.24 -0.22 -0.43 -0.24 -0.24
p-val 0.00 0.17 0.44 0.00 0.16 0.41 0.00 0.16 0.36
NFC Spread+ -0.07 -0.16 -0.14 -0.09 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.23 -0.17
p-val 0.28 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.09
R¯2 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.43 0.38
Unemployment rate
Term Spread 0.18 0.25 0.28 0.17 0.24 0.27 0.17 0.24 0.27
p-val 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.19
Real EONIA -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.10 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.16 -0.16
p-val 0.39 0.51 0.71 0.39 0.49 0.69 0.42 0.56 0.76
NFC Spread 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.36 0.38 0.42
p-val 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.08
NFC Spread+ 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13
p-val 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.09
R¯2 0.70 0.54 0.41 0.70 0.54 0.42 0.70 0.54 0.41
Industrial production
Term Spread -0.54 -0.64 -0.57 -0.53 -0.64 -0.57 -0.53 -0.64 -0.57
p-val 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Real EONIA 0.15 0.16 -0.15 0.17 0.17 -0.14 0.18 0.17 -0.15
p-val 0.49 0.47 0.61 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.46 0.54
Bank Spread -0.17 -0.16 -0.38 -0.15 -0.15 -0.36 -0.15 -0.15 -0.38
p-val 0.40 0.44 0.14 0.46 0.47 0.05 0.49 0.51 0.06
Bank Spread+ -0.25 -0.24 -0.16 -0.31 -0.27 -0.20 -0.33 -0.27 -0.16
p-val 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00
R¯2 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.40
Unemployment rate
Term Spread 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.28
p-val 0.24 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.08
Real EONIA -0.09 -0.08 0.00 -0.11 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 -0.09 0.01
p-val 0.67 0.88 0.99 0.61 0.82 1.00 0.62 0.83 0.97
Bank Spread 0.08 0.14 0.29 0.06 0.12 0.28 0.07 0.14 0.31
p-val 0.64 0.69 0.23 0.73 0.69 0.23 0.70 0.64 0.22
Bank Spread+ 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.22 0.17
p-val 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00
R¯2 0.65 0.49 0.37 0.66 0.50 0.37 0.66 0.49 0.36
Notes: Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:10. Dependent variables is ∇hYt+h, where Yt denotes the respective economic activity variable
in the subpanel title in month t and h is the forecasting horizon. Order of local peak represents the number of periods over
which the asymmetric term of the ﬁnancial variable is computed. Each regressions also include a constant and p lags of the
dependent variable (not reported), where p is chosen by the BIC. Entries in the table denote the standardized estimates of the OLS
coeﬃcients associated with each ﬁnancial indicator, whereas italics terms are the p-values computed by means of the NeweyWest
(1987) correction.
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Table B-2: Credit spreads, economic activity and nonlinearities: France
Order of local peak 12 24 36 36
Forecast horizon 6 12 18 6 12 18 6 12 18
Industrial production
Term Spread 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.62 0.73 0.75 0.62 0.73 0.75
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real EONIA 4.04 3.53 2.14 4.03 3.53 2.15 4.18 3.65 2.18
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03
NFC Spread -0.40 -0.19 -0.15 -0.35 -0.18 -0.14 -0.33 -0.16 -0.13
p-val 0.00 0.15 0.52 0.00 0.16 0.53 0.00 0.20 0.54
NFC Spread+ -0.15 -0.13 -0.03 -0.14 -0.14 -0.05 -0.17 -0.17 -0.06
p-val 0.01 0.01 0.71 0.01 0.01 0.54 0.01 0.00 0.46
R¯2 0.48 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.45
Unemployment rate
Term Spread -0.29 -0.37 -0.33 -0.29 -0.37 -0.32 -0.29 -0.36 -0.32
p-val 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Real EONIA -0.75 -0.84 -0.75 -0.75 -0.84 -0.75 -0.75 -0.84 -0.75
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NFC Spread 0.37 0.50 0.50 0.36 0.49 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.48
p-val 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
NFC Spread+ 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.02
p-val 0.68 0.42 0.35 0.38 0.66 0.50 0.12 0.95 0.58
R¯2 0.73 0.63 0.53 0.73 0.63 0.53 0.73 0.63 0.53
Industrial production
Term Spread 0.71 0.85 0.86 0.68 0.82 0.83 0.66 0.81 0.83
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Real EONIA 2.59 2.54 1.39 2.62 2.58 1.42 2.71 2.63 1.44
p-val 0.03 0.03 0.37 0.02 0.03 0.36 0.02 0.03 0.35
Bank Spread -0.37 -0.30 -0.34 -0.32 -0.26 -0.30 -0.31 -0.24 -0.29
p-val 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.03 0.13 0.26 0.04 0.16 0.27
Bank Spread+ -0.21 -0.12 -0.04 -0.30 -0.19 -0.10 -0.36 -0.25 -0.12
p-val 0.19 0.25 0.75 0.18 0.16 0.49 0.10 0.05 0.37
R¯2 0.42 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.49 0.47
Unemployment rate
Term Spread -0.30 -0.38 -0.35 -0.30 -0.39 -0.35 -0.30 -0.37 -0.34
p-val 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05
Real EONIA -0.59 -0.66 -0.61 -0.59 -0.66 -0.60 -0.59 -0.67 -0.61
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Bank Spread 0.21 0.30 0.31 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.22 0.30 0.30
p-val 0.15 0.22 0.27 0.14 0.16 0.25 0.12 0.16 0.25
Bank Spread+ 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.11
p-val 0.18 0.38 0.53 0.27 0.45 0.53 0.25 0.25 0.39
R¯2 0.67 0.54 0.43 0.67 0.53 0.43 0.67 0.54 0.43
Notes: Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:10. Dependent variables is ∇hYt+h, where Yt denotes the respective economic activity variable
in the subpanel title in month t and h is the forecasting horizon. Order of local peak represents the number of periods over
which the asymmetric term of the ﬁnancial variable is computed. Each regressions also include a constant and p lags of the
dependent variable (not reported), where p is chosen by the BIC. Entries in the table denote the standardized estimates of the OLS
coeﬃcients associated with each ﬁnancial indicator, whereas italics terms are the p-values computed by means of the NeweyWest
(1987) correction.
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Table B-3: Credit spreads, economic activity and nonlinearities: Germany
Order of local peak 12 24 36 36
Forecast horizon 6 12 18 6 12 18 6 12 18
Industrial production
Term Spread 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.57 0.66 0.64 0.55 0.64 0.63
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real EONIA 1.88 1.80 0.56 1.90 1.84 0.61 2.17 2.09 0.79
p-val 0.07 0.04 0.37 0.07 0.03 0.31 0.02 0.02 0.22
NFC Spread -0.44 -0.23 -0.13 -0.38 -0.22 -0.11 -0.37 -0.21 -0.11
p-val 0.00 0.11 0.26 0.00 0.11 0.35 0.00 0.13 0.41
NFC Spread+ -0.04 -0.10 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.15 -0.12 -0.19 -0.19
p-val 0.40 0.02 0.00 0.33 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03
R¯2 0.46 0.52 0.51 0.46 0.52 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.52
Unemployment rate
Term Spread -0.11 -0.19 -0.18 -0.10 -0.18 -0.18 -0.09 -0.18 -0.18
p-val 0.52 0.34 0.58 0.55 0.38 0.58 0.58 0.40 0.59
Real EONIA 0.11 0.15 0.23 0.11 0.15 0.23 0.09 0.14 0.22
p-val 0.38 0.51 0.57 0.40 0.53 0.56 0.49 0.58 0.59
NFC Spread 0.22 0.25 0.16 0.22 0.24 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.16
p-val 0.00 0.04 0.59 0.00 0.03 0.60 0.00 0.03 0.59
NFC Spread+ -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07
p-val 0.75 0.68 0.27 0.95 0.44 0.22 0.40 0.32 0.25
R¯2 0.59 0.40 0.35 0.59 0.40 0.35 0.60 0.40 0.35
Industrial production
Term Spread 0.58 0.74 0.73 0.58 0.74 0.74 0.57 0.74 0.68
p-val 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Real EONIA 0.96 0.83 -0.14 0.94 0.78 -0.36 1.12 0.85 -1.18
p-val 0.56 0.72 0.96 0.58 0.76 0.89 0.54 0.73 0.70
Bank Spread -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.20 -0.20 -0.22 -0.19 -0.20 -0.31
p-val 0.25 0.44 0.63 0.25 0.44 0.54 0.30 0.44 0.43
Bank Spread+ -0.30 -0.16 -0.14 -0.30 -0.13 -0.10 -0.33 -0.15 -0.07
p-val 0.12 0.10 0.03 0.18 0.23 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.43
R¯2 0.41 0.49 0.49 0.40 0.48 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.50
Unemployment rate
Term Spread -0.08 -0.18 -0.19 -0.08 -0.18 -0.20 -0.08 -0.18 -0.20
p-val 0.63 0.49 0.47 0.62 0.50 0.47 0.62 0.50 0.45
Real EONIA 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.17 0.23 0.30 0.17 0.23 0.31
p-val 0.46 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.56 0.51
Bank Spread 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.14
p-val 0.50 0.59 0.72 0.46 0.58 0.73 0.48 0.58 0.71
Bank Spread+ 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.14 0.10 -0.01
p-val 0.32 0.32 0.82 0.47 0.39 0.99 0.47 0.41 0.89
R¯2 0.59 0.37 0.34 0.58 0.37 0.34 0.58 0.37 0.34
Notes: Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:10. Dependent variables is ∇hYt+h, where Yt denotes the respective economic activity variable
in the subpanel title in month t and h is the forecasting horizon. Order of local peak represents the number of periods over
which the asymmetric term of the ﬁnancial variable is computed. Each regressions also include a constant and p lags of the
dependent variable (not reported), where p is chosen by the BIC. Entries in the table denote the standardized estimates of the OLS
coeﬃcients associated with each ﬁnancial indicator, whereas italics terms are the p-values computed by means of the NeweyWest
(1987) correction.
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Table B-4: Credit spreads, economic activity and nonlinearities: Italy
Order of local peak 12 24 36 36
Forecast horizon 6 12 18 6 12 18 6 12 18
Industrial production
Term Spread 1.23 1.10 0.89 1.08 1.09 0.88 1.09 1.10 0.91
p-val 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.08
Real EONIA 7.14 6.38 3.08 7.18 6.41 3.10 7.14 6.37 3.05
p-val 0.07 0.17 0.37 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.08 0.17 0.38
NFC Spread -0.91 -0.64 -0.59 -0.79 -0.63 -0.58 -0.81 -0.66 -0.64
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
NFC Spread+ 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02
p-val 0.96 0.78 0.42 0.66 0.42 0.25 0.99 0.95 0.70
R¯2 0.46 0.37 0.23 0.46 0.37 0.23 0.46 0.37 0.23
Unemployment rate
Term Spread 0.05 -0.08 -0.69 0.07 -0.07 -0.67 0.04 -0.10 -0.71
p-val 0.81 0.83 0.00 0.74 0.85 0.00 0.83 0.79 0.01
Real EONIA -0.34 -0.63 -0.81 -0.35 -0.63 -0.81 -0.34 -0.63 -0.81
p-val 0.48 0.24 0.11 0.47 0.23 0.11 0.44 0.25 0.13
NFC Spread 0.56 0.66 0.82 0.53 0.64 0.80 0.58 0.69 0.85
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04
NFC Spread+ 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 -0.12
p-val 0.77 0.58 0.15 0.38 0.97 0.33 0.89 0.29 0.15
R¯2 0.58 0.52 0.53 0.58 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.52 0.54
Industrial production
Term Spread 1.40 1.52 1.31 1.38 1.50 1.30 1.39 1.52 1.32
p-val 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Real EONIA 6.51 5.60 2.43 6.61 5.65 2.46 6.56 5.60 2.39
p-val 0.07 0.14 0.45 0.06 0.13 0.43 0.06 0.14 0.43
Bank Spread -1.05 -1.09 -1.12 -1.01 -1.06 -1.10 -1.03 -1.09 -1.15
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bank Spread+ -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.05
p-val 0.80 0.92 0.91 0.52 0.60 0.74 0.77 0.97 0.49
R¯2 0.43 0.44 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.36 0.43 0.44 0.36
Unemployment rate
Term Spread -0.07 -0.28 -0.41 -0.03 -0.27 -0.41 -0.05 -0.29 -0.44
p-val 0.75 0.37 0.26 0.89 0.44 0.28 0.81 0.34 0.26
Real EONIA -0.28 -0.55 -0.68 -0.28 -0.53 -0.68 -0.29 -0.55 -0.67
p-val 0.54 0.39 0.24 0.50 0.41 0.22 0.47 0.39 0.24
Bank Spread 0.72 1.00 0.92 0.62 0.96 0.92 0.68 1.01 0.99
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Bank Spread+ 0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.12 -0.10 -0.07
p-val 0.52 0.48 0.74 0.05 0.99 0.84 0.37 0.56 0.44
R¯2 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.57
Notes: Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:10. Dependent variables is ∇hYt+h, where Yt denotes the respective economic activity variable
in the subpanel title in month t and h is the forecasting horizon. Order of local peak represents the number of periods over
which the asymmetric term of the ﬁnancial variable is computed. Each regressions also include a constant and p lags of the
dependent variable (not reported), where p is chosen by the BIC. Entries in the table denote the standardized estimates of the OLS
coeﬃcients associated with each ﬁnancial indicator, whereas italics terms are the p-values computed by means of the NeweyWest
(1987) correction.
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Figure B-1: Euro area and main countries: corporate credit spreads
 
 
Figure B-2: Euro area and main countries: banking credit spreads
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Figure B-3: Euro Area, IRF to a NFC spread shock (Local peak = 12).
Notes: The dark black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an
increase in the spreads, together with its 68% (dark gray shaded area) and its 90% (light grey shaded area).
The straight red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease
in the spreads, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left to right,
responses to shocks of increasing size are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a constant history for the
shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:08.
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Figure B-4: Euro Area, IRF to a Banking spread shock (Local peak = 12).
Notes: The dark black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an
increase in the spreads, together with its 68% (dark gray shaded area) and its 90% (light grey shaded area).
The straight red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease
in the spreads, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left to right,
responses to shocks of increasing size are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a constant history for the
shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 24 months horizon. Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:08.
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Figure B-5: France, IRF to a NFC spread shock (Local peak = 12).
Notes: The dark black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an
increase in the spreads, together with its 68% (dark gray shaded area) and its 90% (light grey shaded area).
The straight red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease
in the spreads, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left to right,
responses to shocks of increasing size are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a constant history for the
shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:08.
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Figure B-6: France, IRF to a Banking spread shock (Local peak = 12).
Notes: The dark black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an
increase in the spreads, together with its 68% (dark gray shaded area) and its 90% (light grey shaded area).
The straight red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease
in the spreads, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left to right,
responses to shocks of increasing size are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a constant history for the
shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 24 months horizon. Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:08.
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Figure B-7: Germany, IRF to a NFC spread shock (Local peak = 12).
Notes: The dark black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an
increase in the spreads, together with its 68% (dark gray shaded area) and its 90% (light grey shaded area).
The straight red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease
in the spreads, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left to right,
responses to shocks of increasing size are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a constant history for the
shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:08.
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Figure B-8: Germany, IRF to a Banking spread shock (Local peak = 12).
Notes: The dark black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an
increase in the spreads, together with its 68% (dark gray shaded area) and its 90% (light grey shaded area).
The straight red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease
in the spreads, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left to right,
responses to shocks of increasing size are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a constant history for the
shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 24 months horizon. Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:08.
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Figure B-9: Italy, IRF to a NFC spread shock (Local peak = 12).
Notes: The dark black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an
increase in the spreads, together with its 68% (dark gray shaded area) and its 90% (light grey shaded area).
The straight red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease
in the spreads, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left to right,
responses to shocks of increasing size are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a constant history for the
shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 12 months horizon. Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:08.
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Figure B-10: Italy, IRF to a Banking spread shock (Local peak = 12).
Notes: The dark black line represents the estimated median impulse response to a positive shock, i.e. an
increase in the spreads, together with its 68% (dark gray shaded area) and its 90% (light grey shaded area).
The straight red line represents the estimated median impulse response to a negative shock, i.e., a decrease
in the spreads, together with its 68% (dotted red lines) and its 90% (dashed red lines). From left to right,
responses to shocks of increasing size are plotted. Here we are conditioning on a constant history for the
shocked variable and the net increase is computed over a 24 months horizon. Sample is 1999:01 - 2014:08.
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C Local projections
According to Jorda (2005) under mild assumptions, a nonlinear time series process yt can be
expressed as a generic function of past shocks vt
yt = φ(vt, vt−1, vt−2, ...) (6)
Provided that φ(.) is well behaved, one can construct a ﬁrst order Taylor expansion around 0
and then get the equivalent of the Wold representation for the nonlinear case, i.e. the Volterra
expansion
yt = Σ
∞
i=0φivt−i + Σ
∞
i=0Σ
∞
j=0φijvt−ivt−j + Σ
∞
i=0Σ
∞
j=0Σ
∞
k=0φijkvt−ivt−jvt−k + ... (7)
where the constant is omitted for simplicity. The previous expression represents the analogous
of the Wold decomposition for the nonlinear case. Jorda (2005) shows that IRFs h periods
ahead can be obtained from direct regressions of yt on its lags from h onwards. These direct
regressions (local projections) are deﬁned as:
yt+h = a
h+Bh1 yt+Q
h
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t +C
h
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3
t +B
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2 yt−1 +Q
h
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2
t−1 +C
h
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3
t−1 + ...+v
h
t+h, ..., s = 0, 1, 2, ..., h (8)
where Qj and Cj represent the quadratic and cubic terms, respectively, and cross-products are
ignored. The impulse response is derived by taking the diﬀerence between the expected value
of yt+h conditional on a shock vector di and the expectation conditional on di being zero.
23
Therefore, the resulting IRF is:
IRF (t, s,di) =
{
B̂s1(yt−1 + di) + Q̂
s
1(yt−1 + di)
2 + Ĉs1(yt−1 + di)
3
}
+ (9)
−
{
B̂s1yt−1 + Q̂
s
1y
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s
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3
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}
=
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B̂s1di + Q̂
s
1(2yt−1di + d
2
i ) + Ĉ
s
1(3y
2
t−1di + 3yt−1d
2
i + d
3
i )
}
,
s = 0, 1, 2, ..., h
23Structural identiﬁcation can be obtained through an impact matrix A0 such that vt = A0ηt and ηt are the
structural shocks.
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Ignoring quadratic and cubic terms, but considering that we also have local peak terms, leads
to the following expression:
IRF (t, s,di) =
{
B̂s1(yt−1 + di) + Θ̂
s
1(yt−1 + di)
+
}
+ (10)
−
{
B̂s1yt−1 + Θ̂
s
1(yt−1)
+
}
=
{
B̂s1di + Θ̂
s
1[(yt−1 + di)
+ − (yt−1)+]
}
,
s = 0, 1, 2, ..., h
corresponding to the one that appears in the main text.
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